1. Field of the Invention
The present invention is generally directed to RFID tag detection, and more particularly directed to RFID tag detection and re-personalization.
2. Background Art
There is a critical need to reduce congestion and speed processing in government processes that broadly fit into the category of “credential verification.” For example, travelers moving through U.S. Ports of Entry must show travel documents which are checked for accuracy, validity, and to assure that the document is being used by the person to whom it was issued. Back-end databases are used to verify that biographic and issuance information is current, valid, and that biometric information matches the individual at the portal. However, it takes time to do all of these checks and hours-long backups are seen on a routine basis because of these checks. These backups have severe economic, social, and environmental impacts.
Many technologies have been proposed to help speed these processes. Taken broadly, they vary from smart cards using sophisticated encryption and authentication to simple RFID tags supporting meter-long read distances and fast access. The advantages of RFID include low cost, very small size, easier presentation of the tag to a reader, and concurrent operation with other tags within range. RFID allows information related to a person to be pre-fetched when the RFID “tag” is sensed at a distance; the retrieved information is made available to an inspector when the person arrives at the checkpoint. Processing times for individuals at Ports of Entry can be reduced by at least half, if this process is well-implemented.
However, a common objection to the use of RFID is that information on the tag is relatively easily sensed by third parties. Even though no privacy-sensitive information is stored on tags (a unique identifier [UID] is stored and used to access a secure backend database), there is a concern that the UID may be compromised by a covert read of the information on a tag and become the equivalent of a “name” for the person who holds the tag. Thus, by continued surveillance of the traveler, the third party may be able to associate the UID with the traveler's identity. A means to address this concern would be to encrypt the UID. But the encrypted UID is just a different pattern of bits that can be considered a stable “nickname” for the UID, and the same concern described above applies—it would be possible to track the nickname instead of the UID.
Accordingly, what are needed are improved approaches for using RFID tags for applications such as those described above, as well as other applications involving identification/verification of persons or things, where security and confidentiality of such persons/things are not compromised.